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I         n November 2005, the government
launched its hunger mitigation initiative
consisting of two programs: the Food-for-
School Program (FSP) and the Tindahan
Natin Program (TNP) amidst rising concerns
about the prevalence of hunger. The FSP is a
conditional food transfer program that
provides a kilo of rice to families suffering
from severe hunger, through their children
in Department of Social Welfare and Devel-
opment (DSWD)-accredited day care centers
and Department of Education (DepEd)-
operated public elementary schools. On the
other hand, TNP is a targeted food price
subsidy program that aims to ensure the
availability of low-priced basic food com-
modities (rice and instant noodles) to poor
families through Tindahan Natin outlets.
An appreciation of how well these programs
fare in directing their intended benefits to
the poor is important because their success
in this regard has a large bearing on pro-
gram effectiveness and efficiency. In turn,
who benefits from the FSP and TNP is
dependent on the targeting mechanism used
to identify the beneficiaries of the program.
This Policy Notes assesses the targeting rules
used for the two programs and determines
how adequately (or inadequately) they
enable the benefits of the programs to reach
their intended beneficiaries.
Targeting: some definitions
Targeting is a means of increasing the
efficiency of a program by increasing the
benefits that the poor can get with a fixed
program budget (Coady, Grosh, and
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Hoddinott 2004).1 Conversely, it is a means
that will allow the government to reduce the
budget requirement of a program while still
delivering the same level of benefits to the
poor (Box 1).
Any targeting method, however, will most
likely fail to include some of the poor while
including some nonpoor households. Good
targeting minimizes both errors of exclusion
and of inclusion. An error of exclusion
occurs when intended beneficiaries are not
able or permitted to participate in the
intervention while an error of inclusion
takes place when an intervention reaches
individuals who are not intended to be
beneficiaries.
Given this perspective, estimates of under-
coverage rates and leakage rates may be
used to assess the performance of alterna-
tive targeting mechanisms. The under-
coverage rate (a measure of the exclusion
error) is the ratio of the number of poor
households who do not participate in the
program to the total number of poor house-
holds. On the other hand, the leakage rate
(a measure of the inclusion error) is the
ratio of number of nonpoor beneficiaries to
the total number of beneficiaries.
Targeting also involves costs: (a) adminis-
trative costs (e.g., costs of collecting infor-
mation), (b) private costs (i.e., cost house-
holds incur in order to participate in the
program), (c) social costs (refers to the
stigma involved in being publicly identified
as poor or needy), and (d) incentive costs
(including negative incentive effects like
reduced work effort and crowding out of
private transfers). The higher these costs
are, the smaller will be the portion of the
program budget that will be available for
distribution as benefits to the beneficiaries.
Thus, in evaluating which targeting method
is appropriate, one has to weigh the benefits
from reduced leakage against the cost of
implementing finer targeting methods.
______________
1 Coady, D., M. Grosh, and J. Hoddinott. 2004. Targeting of
transfers in developing countries: review of lessons and
experience. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.




Higher per capita transfer with fixed budget (say, PhP1,000)
With perfect targeting: PhP20 benefit per beneficiary
With no targeting: PhP10 benefit per beneficiary
Smaller budget with fixed per capita transfer to the poor (say, PhP10)
With perfect targeting: PhP500 (or 50% budget savings)
With no targeting: PhP1,000
Any targeting method...will most likely fail to include
some of the poor while including some nonpoor
households. Good targeting minimizes both errors of
exclusion and of inclusion. An error of exclusion
occurs when intended beneficiaries are not able or
permitted to participate in the intervention while an
error of inclusion takes place when an intervention




Assessing the hunger mitigation
programs: how well are they targeted?
Food-for-School Program2
First and foremost, the Food-for-School
Program is an intervention that is meant to
address hunger among poor families. It is
also meant to improve school attendance of
the children of these households by assur-
ing them of having one kilo of rice on their
tables every day as long as their children go
to school or to the day care centers.
The beneficiaries of the program are house-
holds in selected geographic areas with
children who are preschool or Grade 1 pupils
in public elementary schools or children who
attend DSWD-accredited day care centers (DCCs).
Targeting mechanism
To identify the geographic areas that are
covered by the program, the FSP makes use
of the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability
Information Mapping System (FIVIMS).3 The
FSP is targeted to include all the preschool/
Grade 1 pupils in all public schools as well
as all the children enrolled in all DSWD-
supervised day care centers in the following
areas:
z All the municipalities and cities (17) in
the National Capital Region (NCR);
z All the municipalities (49) of the prov-
inces classified as very, very vulnerable
(VVV) in the FIVIMS;
z All the 5th and 6th class municipalities
(283) of the provinces classified as very
vulnerable (VV) and vulnerable (V) in
the FIVIMS;
z All the 4th class municipalities (27) in
the VV and V provinces where there are
no 5th and 6th class municipalities; and
z All the 3rd class municipalities (3) in the
VV and V provinces where there are no
4th, 5th, and 6th class municipalities.
Thus, the FSP combines geographic target-
ing with institutional targeting at the level
of the public school or day care center.
Geographic targeting under the FSP occurs
at two levels. First, the most food-insecure
and vulnerable (i.e., poorest) provinces are
identified and selected. Second, because of
an implicit recognition that the province is
too big a unit to be homogeneous in terms
of food insecurity/poverty, the FSP deems it
appropriate to identify and select the
relatively more food-insecure (i.e., poorer)
municipalities within each of the poorest
provinces. Once a municipality is selected to
______________
2 The analysis done here refers to the implementation of the
FSP and the TNP in 2006. However, targeting of the FSP in
2007 made use of the 2003 Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES) following its official release in October 2006.
The application of the same counterfactual analysis that was
done in this section to the 2007 FSP yields similar results.
However, it appears that difference in leakage/undercoverage
rates arising from the use of more recent data is dwarfed by
the difference that results when the small area estimates of
poverty incidence are used.
3 The FIVIMS is designed to identify food-insecure and
vulnerable provinces in the country. It is anchored on an
index that is composed of 12 core indicators (Valientes et
al. 2006), namely: (1) ratio of per capita income to per
capita expenditure, (2) poverty incidence, (3) median family
income, (4) ratio of food expenditure to total household
expenditure, (5) ratio of cereal food expenditure to total
food expenditure, (6) unemployment rate, (7) cohort
survival rate at the elementary level, (8) percentage of
families with working children, (9) percentage of households
with safe water, (10) percentage of underweight children,
(11) percentage of underweight adults, and (12) percentage
of agricultural land under tenancy.PN 2007-07
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be part of the FSP, however, all preschool
and Grade 1 pupils in all the identified
public schools (and all children enrolled in
the DSWD-supervised day care centers) in
said municipality automatically become
eligible to receive the benefits of the program.
Weaknesses of targeting rule
The FSP shares the advantages of most other
geographically targeted social transfer
programs. It is administratively simple and
inexpensive to implement. However, the
evidence suggests that FSP’s brand of
geographic targeting can still be improved
to increase the program’s efficiency and
effectiveness. These potential efficiency
gains may be gleaned and better appreci-
ated by considering three counter-factual
scenarios: one where the existing targeting
rule prevails, and two scenarios where
alternative targeting rules are applied.
International experience suggests that
geographical targeting works best when
poverty differs across regions but is similar
within regions, i.e., there is within-region
homogeneity (Hoddinott 1999).4 In the
Philippines, evidence indicates that the
within-province variation is more important
than the between-province variation in
explaining the total variation in poverty
incidence across municipalities. In particu-
lar, the analysis of variance of the small area
estimates (SAE)5 of municipal level poverty
incidence shows that between-province
variation accounts for a mere 32 percent of
the total variation in municipal level poverty
incidence. It is perhaps the implicit recogni-
tion of this result that prompted the FSP
implementers to differentiate municipalities
within the different target provinces accord-
ing to the LGU income classification.
The ranking of municipalities according to
their income class does not correlate well
with their ranking according to small area
estimate of poverty incidence. This is true
whether one is looking at the ranking of
municipalities within a province or the
ranking of municipalities across the nation.
For instance, 155 (or 50%) of the 313
municipalities in the VV and V provinces are
found not to be among the poorest munici-
palities even within each of these provinces
under the FIVIMS.
In order to gain a better appreciation of
these issues, the leakage rates, the under-
coverage rates, and the share of the poor in
program benefits are estimated for the
existing targeting rule and for two
counterfactual scenarios where alternative
targeting rules are applied. Under the first
alternative targeting rule (or alternative rule
#1), the FSP is targeted to the SAE’s poorest
municipalities in each of the VV and V
provinces under FIVIMS rather than to the
5th and 6th income class municipalities in
______________
4 Hoddinott, J. 1999. Targeting: principles and practice.
International Food Policy Research Institute.
5 The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB 2005)
estimated small area estimates of municipal level poverty
incidence by combining data from the 2000 Family Income
and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the 2000 Census of Population
and Households (CPH) and the 2000 Labor Force Survey (LFS).PN 2007-07
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the same provinces. For the second alterna-
tive targeting rule (alternative targeting rule
#2), meanwhile, the FSP is targeted directly
to the SAE’s poorest municipalities instead
of targeting the poorest provinces first
before selecting the target municipalities
within each of the target provinces.
The results of the counterfactual simulations
show that both the leakage and under-
coverage rates are reduced while the share
of the benefits going to the poor is in-
creased when these alternative targeting
rules are applied.6 Specifically, the leakage
rate in the DepEd component declines from
62 percent under the existing targeting rule
to 55 percent under alternative targeting
rule #1. Conversely, the share of the poor in
total program benefits increases correspond-
ingly from 38 percent to 45 percent for the
DepEd component.
Under alternative targeting rule #2, the
results show that 230 (or 61%) out of the
379 cities/municipalities that were originally
targeted under the FSP would not be eligible
to receive FSP benefits under the DepEd
component. In other words, these munici-
palities/cities targeted under the DepEd
component of the FSP in 2006 are not the
poorest municipalities/cities from a global
perspective. This number includes all the
cities and municipalities in the NCR.
The inclusion in the FSP of all cities and
municipalities in the NCR results in a sub-
stantial leakage of FSP benefits to nonpoor
beneficiaries. This is in view of the fact that
while the NCR accounts for 49 percent of the
total number of beneficiaries under the
DepEd component of the FSP, it has the
lowest poverty incidence (6.9%) among all
provinces/regions in the country. Conse-
quently, it accounts for 71 percent of the
total number of nonpoor households who
benefit from the program. The cost of this
leakage is the price government has to pay
to gain political support from a more visible
and vocal constituency to ensure budget
support for the program.
Given this, it is not surprising that the
resulting reduction in the leakage rate, if
alternative targeting rule #2 were applied, is
dramatic as it drops to 24 percent assuming
that the actual number of beneficiaries
reached in 2006 is maintained (Table 1).
On the other hand, the program’s ability to
reach poor households is found to improve
with the adoption of either one of the two
alternative targeting rules. With the applica-
tion of alternative targeting rule #1, the
undercoverage rate in the DepEd component
decreases from 80 percent under the exist-
ing targeting rule to 72 percent. Meanwhile,
if alternative targeting rule #2 were fol-
lowed, the undercoverage declines further to
53 percent.
______________
6 Only the results of the counterfactual simulation for the
DepEd component are shown in this Policy Notes. For the
results of the simulations for the DSWD component, refer to
PIDS Discussion Paper No. 2007-10. It should be pointed
out that the results for the DSWD component are similar to




The TNP has two components. On the one
hand, the program provides DSWD loan
assistance/credit to SEA-K Kabayan, SEA-K
Association, or SEA-K individual beneficia-
ries with retail store business in strategically
located sites that are accessible to intended
beneficiaries of the TNP.
As with the FSP, the identification of the
target provinces for the TNP stores is based
on the FIVIMS. Once a province is targeted
for TNP, the DSWD, National Food Authority
(NFA), LGU, and the Barangay Council are
then tasked to ensure that the number of
TNP stores in the LGU will be adequate.
On the other hand, as originally designed,
only eligible TNP household beneficiaries
may purchase food items at NFA’s prescribed
selling prices from the TNP stores. Eligible
beneficiaries can only purchase a maximum
of 14 kg of rice per week.7 A
family ID cum passbook is
issued by the LGU-P/C/




of TNP household beneficia-
ries is the responsibility of
the DSWD in coordination
with the LGU-P/C/MSWDOs and the barangay
councils. In principle, the target beneficia-
ries of the TNP are families who have in-
comes below the food threshold. At present,
however, there are no longer any restrictions
placed on who may buy the subsidized rice/
noodles from the TNP stores. As such, all
households within the catchment area of the
TNP store are allowed to purchase the
subsidized food items.
Targeting mechanism
The TNP, like the FSP, employs the FIVIMS to
implement geographic targeting at the level
of the province. For the TNP below the level
of the province, however, targeting is done
at the regional level jointly by the National
Nutrition Council (NNC), DSWD, NFA, LGUs,
and the local SWDOs. The TNP targets the
actual location of TNP stores below the level
of the municipality (i.e., at the barangay
level) on the basis of a rapid poverty map-
ping that was conducted by the DSWD just
prior to the start of the TNP.8
Said poverty appraisal focused on the
______________
7 The weekly allocation per family is based on the average
per capita rice consumption of 115 kg per year.
8 This information was based on a telephone interview with
an official of Region IV-A.
Table 1. Leakage rate and undercoverage rate under alternative targeting
rules for DepEd component of FSP, 2006 (in percent)
 
Targeting Rule Leakage  Undercoverage Share of the Poor
     Rate          Rate in Total Transfers
 
FIVIMS priority provinces and municipalities
according to income class 62 80 38
 
FIVIMS priority provinces and municipalities
according to SAE 55 72 45
 
Directly to municipalities according to SAE; 24 53 76
same number of actual beneficiaries as nowPN 2007-07
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prevalence of malnutrition and lack of rice
supply. Such an approach has the potential
advantage of the fieldworker being able to
detect the special circumstances of the
different areas in a more timely manner. The
main drawback of this approach though is
the difficulty of maintaining uniformity and
consistency across municipalities
(barangays) within and, most especially,
across provinces (municipalities). It may
also be perceived as open to favoritism and/
or political interference.
Closer scrutiny of the actual location of the
TNP stores and the corresponding number of
beneficiaries served reveals the unevenness
in the quality of the targeting below the
level of the province. For instance, some
target provinces appeared to have made use
of the LGU income classification in targeting
municipalities (e.g., Abra and La Union).9
Other provinces (e.g., Agusan provinces,
Surigao del Norte, and Palawan) seem to
have a good sense of which municipalities
are SAE poor while others appear to have no
discernable targeting pattern (e.g., Surigao
del Sur, Ifugao, Romblon, Albay, Camarines
Norte) and have thereupon excluded many
poor municipalities while including many
nonpoor municipalities.
The location of TNP stores also appears to
have been dictated by their accessibility to
major road networks. Since the TNP store
operator shoulders the hauling cost of
transporting the commodities to the store, it
is not surprising that the TNP tends to have
a greater presence in the more urbanized
areas.
Given the geographic distribution of the TNP
stores across the country as well as the
number of beneficiaries served by these
stores, the leakage rate of the TNP is esti-
mated to be equal to 66 percent for the
entire program and 59 percent if NCR stores
are not included.10 This implies that 66
percent of the program benefits accrue to
nonpoor households.
Conclusions and recommendations
The results of the above assessment high-
light the pitfalls of geographic targeting
based on the provincial level poverty inci-
dence and income class of municipalities,
namely:
z ranking of municipalities according to
their income class does not correlate
well with  ranking according to small
area estimate of poverty incidence, and
z within-province variation is more impor-
tant than the between-province variation
in explaining the total variation in the
poverty incidence across municipalities.
Said results suggest that significant im-
provements in targeting can be achieved if
one targets municipalities directly using
small area estimates of poverty incidence
which have recently become available.
______________
9 However, not all 5th and 6th class municipalities of Abra
are targeted. The same is true of Surigao del Norte but it is
notable that those included are also those which are SAE poor.
10 These figures are computed based on the small area
estimates of poverty incidence at the municipal level.PN 2007-07
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International experience also suggests that
combining household targeting (using
verified means test or proxy means test)
with geographic targeting can improve
accuracy (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott
2004). As such, it would be useful to assess
the gains, if any, of complementing geo-
graphic targeting (using small area esti-
mates) with direct household targeting
(using some variant of community-based
monitoring systems). Potential gains would
then have to be evaluated vis-à-vis the cost
of direct household targeting. Such an
assessment would require firm estimates of
the:
z full cost of installation and maintenance,
and
z potential gains from household target-
ing in terms of exclusion rates and
leakage rates.
At the same time, the experience of the FSP
and TNP underscores the importance of
thinking more carefully about the appropri-
ate role of the central government and local
government units in targeting. On the one
hand, the FSP experience points to the
possibility of the central government get-
ting it wrong. On the other hand, the TNP
highlights the opportunities and risks
involved in allowing LGUs to play a major
role in targeting. It demonstrates how some
provinces are able to perform better than
others in identifying the poor within their
jurisdictions.
Given this, it is important to balance the
lower transactions and information costs, on
the one hand, and the suboptimal outcomes
from local rent-seeking and local capture
arising from a greater LGU role in targeting,
on the other. In principle, the proximity of
local governments to the people enables
them to deliver services more efficiently
than the more remote central government.
However, the decentralization of targeting
decisions may tempt local officials to ma-
nipulate and exploit local information,
especially when the gains from the program
are perceived to be large.
In this regard, there are important advan-
tages of a system that combines centralized
design and database management with
localized collection of data. Under such set-
up, it is important to put into place mecha-
nisms like NG-LGU cost sharing arrange-
ments and financial incentives to LGUs to
ensure quality at all levels.
Finally, the need for up-to-date and more
disaggregated statistics (at the very least at
the level of the municipalities) cannot be
overemphasized. 
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